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Abstract. Th e article examines the implicit tradition of deep semiotics in Russia initiated 
by Gustav Shpet, a Russian philosopher of language. Shpet’s semiotic approach was 
developed synchronously with the major lines of European and American semiotics 
(Saussurian and Peircean), but has not been suffi  ciently known or studied. Th e recent 
publication of previously unknown papers by Shpet makes this Russian philosopher 
an advanced fi gure on the Russian semiotic scene. Shpet was one of the  rst Russian 
scholars to use the term ‘semiotics’, by which he meant a “general ontological study of 
signs”. Shpet used this term in his work History as a Problem of Logic as early as in 1916. 
Shpet’s main work on semiotics, the book Language and Sense (1920s), traced back the 
origins of semiotic thinking and laid the foundations for new semiotics, by which he 
meant a science of understanding signs. It is here that Shpet spoke of the ontological 
study of a sign, calling this study semiotics, or else characterics, and raising the issue of 
the semiotic mind.1 
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1. Gustav Shpet and semiotics
Russian humanities of the 20th century can boast of many groundbreakers in virtually any 
fi eld of scholarly expertise and critical thought, who worked ahead of or synchronously 
with their Western counterparts, yet appeared to have a less enviable career on their 
native soil than their peers from Europe and America. Th is is also the case with Gustav 
Shpet (1879–1937), Russian philosopher of language who, apart from making other 
1  Th e article is a modifi ed and updated version of the author’s earlier publications in Russian 
(see Feschenko 2008a) and in French (see Feschenko 2008b).  




valuable contributions to philosophical thought, initiated a particular tradition of deep 
semiotics in Russia. Shpet himself did not use the term ‘deep semiotics’, but the metaphor 
of depth was omnipresent in his writings on language, signs, and understanding. Th e 
main objective of this approach was to study the deep layers of the self and the “depths” 
of the sign’s structure, that is, the relation of inner and outer dimensions of the sign as a 
carrier of human cognition. Shpet’s semiotic approach was developed synchronically with 
the major lines in European and American semiotics (loosely speaking, the Saussurian 
and Peircean ones), but is not suffi  ciently known and studied. Th e recent publications 
of previously unknown papers by Shpet makes this philosopher an advanced fi gure 
on the Russian semiotic scene. 
     Until quite recently, Shpet’s name rarely came up in semiotic studies. References to 
his works occasionally appeared only in outlines of the history of Russian and Soviet 
semiotics. Th e Russian semiotician Vyacheslav Ivanov was the fi rst to highlight Shpet’s 
role in semiotics, characterizing him as the “fi rst Russian philosopher to give a detailed 
justifi cation of a need to study signs as a specifi c domain of scientifi c inquiry and to 
develop the foundations of a phenomenological and hermeneutical approach to it” 
(Ivanov 1999[1976]: 681). Alongside with Pavel Florensky and Andrey Bely, Shpet was 
mentioned among those pioneers who undertook a general synthesis of semiotic ideas 
about literature, arts, and culture in the early 20th century (Freiberger-Sheikholeslami 
1980). What proved to be most notable was Shpet’s ideas derived from Edmund Husserl 
about signs as a “general layer” which determines the original assumptions of any social 
and historical knowledge. Also noted were his attempts of semiotic interpretation of 
aesthetics in “Aesthetic fragments” (“Esteticheskie fragmenty”; see Shpet 2007[1923]), 
which envisaged the aesthetic object – such as the word in poetry – as a multi-layered 
complex sign. In 1982, during the Soviet years, the journal Sign Systems Studies (Trudy 
po znakovym sistemam) published Shpet’s article “Literature” (“Literatura”; Shpet 
1982) that he had planned to publish in the Dictionary of Artistic Terms in the 1920s 
(Shpet 1982). However, not much can be said about the infl uence of Shpet’s legacy on 
semiotic studies in the 1960s-70s. Shpet’s name appears in recent Russian textbooks on 
semiotics (Pocheptsov 2001: 204–218; Mechkovskaya 2004: 38–42), and the philosopher’s 
psychological views on language and the word form the subject of another study guide 
(Zinchenko 2000). In her book on Shpet, Tat’yana Schedrina very briefl y outlines his 
role in the development of Russian structuralism and semiotics (Schedrina 2004).
    Only three of Shpet’s books have been translated into European languages: Appearance 
and Sense into English and French (Shpet 1991; Chpet 2013), Hermeneutics and Its 
Problems into German (Shpet 1993) and Th e Inner Form of the Word into French 
(Chpet 2007). Besides, the year 2009 saw the publication of a highly valuable edited 
volume Gustav Shpet’s Contribution to Philosophy and Cultural Th eory (Tihanov 2009), 
but this scholarly collection does not contain any specifi c studies on Shpet’s relevance 
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in semiotic studies (apart from indirect references to his vision of signs in the context 
of phenomenology and philosophy of language in Brandist 2009; Radunović 2009; 
Seifrid 2009). Another important scholarly collection in French (Dennes 2008) includes 
several articles on Shpet’s philosophy of language (Velmezova 2008; Ioff e 2008). Philip 
T. Grier (2009) has made an interesting account of Shpet’s concept of discourse as a 
philosophical challenge to modern semiotics. In Russia, however, Shpet’s major work 
on semiotics Language and Sense was published on the basis of archival material only 
as recently as ten years ago (Shpet 2005), and we can postulate that Shpet’s semiotics 
is just now beginning to be seriously studied. Shpet’s semiotics is addressed in recent 
Russian publications on Shpet (Schedrina 2004; Lektorskij et al. 2006; Dennes et al. 2010).
     Th e aim of this article is not to outline the whole spectrum of Shpet’s semiotic 
ideas. I will only concentrate on his general conception of semiotics and discuss the 
term ‘semiotics’ as used by Shpet, as well as the basic semiotic categories as treated in 
his works. I will also give a slightly more detailed account of Shpet’s original model 
of the sign as diff erent from other major sign theories. Finally, I will place his ideas 
on semiotics within the more extensive tradition of deep semiotics in Russia, of which 
Shpet was one of the pioneers.
2. The term ‘semiotics’ in Shpet’s writings
At the time of the publication of Shpet’s fi rst essays on the topic of semiotics  in the 
1910s, the discipline was only just beginning to assert its academic rights, although 
problems of semiotics had been a subject of discussion in European thought from as 
early as the Antiquity. Yet Shpet was arguably one of the fi rst Russian thinkers to use the 
term ‘semiotics’ outside of medical context. By semiotics he understood an “ontological 
study of signs in general” (Shpet 2007[1923]: 230). For Shpet, ontology was the core 
problem for a metaphysics that inquired into life, lived experience, and essences of 
being. At this point I will stress the attribute ‘ontological’ which will appear in a more 
specifi c context below.
     Shpet fi rst introduced the word ‘semiotics’ in the 1915 article on the history of 
rationalist philosophy (Shpet 1915). Later, the article was transformed into a chapter 
of his lengthy treatise History as a Problem of Logic (Shpet 2002[1916]). Already in 
this early essay, he advanced the idea that logic is not able to address historical notions 
adequately, as these are subject to a specifi c “semiotic knowledge” which requires its own 
methodology. According to Shpet, the logic of a historical notion regarded as a certain 
articulated meaning should be, in eff ect, a semiotic discipline. Th e meaning of a historical 
notion is already a sign in itself, which can only be deciphered through a special kind 
of hermeneutics. It should be noted, though, that in the beginning Shpet still hesitated 
about how to name this new science – hermeneutics or semiotics. However, as we shall 
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see later, in defi ning this discipline he prioritized not the terminological title as such, but 
rather its ties with other fi elds of knowledge involved in the analysis of understanding 
as a historical mechanism. From his point of view, semiotics should be a branch of 
hermeneutics. Following Wilhelm Dilthey, Shpet understands hermeneutics as a study 
of the trinary structure “experience-expression-understanding”. Th e key innovation 
in Shpet’s hermeneutics was that “he placed the task of a philosophical grounding 
for the hermeneutic canon squarely within a fundamental analysis of understanding” 
(Haardt 1993: 127) and that in this he was guided by a “combination of semiotics 
and hermeneutics within the horizon of a ‘phenomenology of understanding reason’” 
(Haardt 1993: 136). Sphet analyses signs through a hermeneutical lens (Bird 2009).
     What was even more important to him was that semiotics should become an alternative 
to the studies of logic that do not account for the semiotic essence of historical thinking. 
Meanwhile, reintroducing the term ‘semiotics’ he, in his own words, adhered more to 
John Locke2 than to more modern philosophers dealing with signs, such as, for example, 
the German thinker Gustav Teichmüller who worked in Tartu (then known as Dorpat) 
in the 1870s–80s (Shpet 1915: 381)3. Peter Steiner (2003: 353) remarks that, according 
to Shpet, in the historical discourse words are meta-signs or “knots in a truly endless 
mesh of semiotic permutations, substitutions, refl ections”. Hermeneutics understood 
as semiotics is aimed at undoing these knots.
     In his book History as a Problem of Logic, Shpet developed the idea of a rapprochement 
of hermeneutics as a study of understanding, and semiotics as a method of understanding 
signs. Evidence in a historical inquiry is not a mere “observation”, he notes, but always a 
sign subject to interpretation. Reasoning about how historical knowledge is created he 
wrote, “historical knowledge is never a sensual or rational knowledge, or a knowledge 
of the outer or inner experience, it is always knowledge assuming comprehension 
and interpretation as a means of comprehension. It can be agreed to call this kind of 
knowledge semiotic knowledge. It requires its own gnoseology”4 (Shpet 2002[1916]: 
287). History, for Shpet, deals with the word as a sign, which is of interest to the historian 
primarily because of its meaning, i.e. that what the word communicates. A need for 
hermeneutics arises when, “a will arises consciously to realize the role of the word as a 
sign of communication” (Shpet 1989: 234). Th is need leads to a fundamentally semiotic 
approach. In Aesthetical Fragments Shpet wrote that “the theory of the word as a sign 
is an objective of formal ontology, or the study of objects, as a branch of semiotics” 
(Shpet 2007[1923]: 208). Here and there, Shpet equalled semiotics to characteristics, 
2 Shpet specifi cally referred to Chapter 21 of Book IV of An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, where Locke distinguished semiotics as a separate science – a doctrine of signs.
3 Shpet also made a reference to Teichmüller in his essay Consciousness and its Master. 
4 Translations from Gustav Shpet are mine – V. F.
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mind” as he called it.
     Later on, in the 1920s, Shpet wrote the book Language and Sense where he traced 
the origins of semiotic thinking and laid the foundations for new semiotics, now more 
clearly defi ned as a ‘study of understanding signs’. It should be specially emphasized 
that semiotics for Shpet is not just a study of signs or sign systems, but a study of 
understanding signs: “We should look more closely”, he wrote, “at the very fact of the 
sociohistorical, we should reveal that the sociohistorical is a comprehended sign and 
is given to us as a sign. Th e sign in general and the social-historical sign, in particular, 
have a common fundamentally ontological nature” (Shpet 2005: 476). We can see from 
these remarks that Shpet treated semiotics from a broad social-historical perspective. 
Th e origin of any historical knowledge lies in the word and the word “is the sign from 
which the historian approaches his object with its specifi c contents constituting the 
meaning and sense of this sign” (Shpet 2002[1916]: 303). What he was guided by in 
his thought is the problem of understanding that lies on the border between semiotics, 
hermeneutics and phenomenology. 
     In opposing formal logics, based on Immanuel Kant and analyses of forms of 
expression beyond sense and understanding, Shpet drew on German and Austrian 
philosophy of language, represented by Anton Marty and Heinrich Gomperz, both 
representatives of the Brentano school of philosophy, and the authors of a theory of 
semasiology as a study of functions and meanings of linguistic means (Marty 1908; 
Gomperz 1908). Semasiology, Shpet maintained, allows to consider not the sociohistorical 
origin of a sign (which is the method of formal logics and empirical semiotics), but 
to categorize the very sociohistorical object in terms of the sign: “All this should be 
prepared by  specifying of the semasiological object in the material and ontological 
respects, too” (Shpet 2005: 476). Holding that semiotics only studies formal ontology in 
contrast to the material study of sign varieties Shpet seemed to deny semiotics in favour 
of semasiology, but made the reservation that “a special task would be a philosophically 
material study of this issue as an issue of semiotic consciousness” (Shpet 2005: 477). It 
follows, then, that semiotics should be based on semasiological principles (see Ageeva 
2008). Shpet was aware that studying this range of issues requires an elaboration of 
specifi c terminology. In Language and Sense, he proceeded to defi ning the key terms 
and concepts of his semiotical theory.
apparently referring to Leibniz’s doctrine. He also raised the question of a “semiotic 
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3. Semiotic concepts according to Shpet
Let us recall the classic defi nition of the sign by Saint Augustine: “a sign is a thing which, 
over and above the impression it makes on the senses, causes something else to come 
into the mind as a consequence of itself ” (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 2.1)5. 
Building upon this defi nition, Shpet pointed out that the main philosophical problem 
of reality or, more precisely, of the relation of the ideal and the real, is fundamentally 
related to the problem of the sign. However, one cannot defi ne the sign a priori, he 
continued, without addressing a whole range of semiotic and phenomenological issues.
     In the fi rst instance, the problem Shpet was interested in was the problem of an 
object and the form of its expression. Does any object possess “semiotic properties” 
or not? Th is was Shpet’s fi rst concern. If any object could be said to possess semiotic 
properties, then “we would have to consider the object implied by this sign as a sign of 
something else, in its turn” (Shpet 2005: 492). Th is would result in an infi nite semiotic 
regression: “Any object, then, would be essentially semantic in its character: any point 
in its logical layer would correspond to a point in its ontological nature”. Shpet is not 
satisfi ed with this kind of semiotic theory. According to him, formal semiotic analysis 
does not settle the problem, and there is still doubt “whether there is something else 
in the object that would not be reduced to its semiotic properties, for is the sign given 
to us not only as a sign but also as a certain physical thing, for example?” (Shpet 2005: 
492–493). In defi ning the sign, therefore, he proposed to go beyond formal logic and 
resort to semiotics as an ontological study of signs. 
     As an object of double essence, the sign refers both to the actual empirical world 
and the ideal plane comprehended in thinking. However, the relation between these 
two planes is not limited to mere relation between the individual and the kind: “To 
expose this relation as an object sui generis and to specify the experience correlative 
to it – this is where the magnetic pole of the problem resides” (Shpet 2005: 512). It 
should be made clear, Shpet noted, what exactly makes the sign two-faced and what 
specifi cally distinguishes it from the whole sphere of real objects: “A ‘sign’ is correlative 
to a ‘meaning’.” It should be shown, Shpet writes, “what is this correlation about”. Th e 
sign acts as a term of correlation, at the same time being a certain object, a thing. “Is 
any thing a sign or can any thing be a sign? What makes a thing a sign…? […] A sign 
given to us as an object of sensual reality – is it a thing or a property?” (Shpet 2005 
512–513). Th ese are the questions raised and discussed by Shpet. 
     Th e chapter titles of the book Language and Sense outline the conceptual framework 
of Shpet’s semiotics: “Sign as subject of correlation”, “Sign as object of actual world”, “Sign 
as correlation”, “Sign-meaning as correlation sui generis and its system”, “Diff erentiation 
of signs”, “Signs in attributive reality” and so on.  Without entering a detailed discussion 
5 St. Augustine's text can be accessed at http://faculty.georgetown.edu/jod/augustine/ddc.html.
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of all of them here, I will just comment on the focal point of this conception.  Th rough 
the concept of sign Shpet seeks to get an answer to his main questions: What is a notion? 
What is a word? What is a meaning/sense? 
4. From the structure of sign to the structure of the sense: 
Shpet’s dynamic model
Shpet’s original conception of the sign diff ers substantially from most other conceptions 
prior or contemporary to him, namely those of Charles Sanders Peirce, Ferdinand de 
Saussure, Gottlob Frege, C. K. Odgen – I. A. Richards and Karl Bühler. Th e core diff erence 
lies in Shpet’s ontologism and orientation towards the process of understanding signs. 
As for Saussure, he never actually considered the problem of communicating signs6. 
Frege only established the basic scheme of the sign’s reference to reality. Peirce and 
Bühler made a move towards the communicative function of the sign and the problem 
of the interpretant. However, neither Peirce nor Bühler acccounted for the authorial, or 
personological, nature of human semiosis. Curiously enough, Bühler was, as much as 
Shpet, drawing on Marty’s studies in semasiology. However, Shpet’s conclusions diff er 
signifi cantly from Bühler’s, whose classifi cation of signs falls short of both ontological 
and hermeneutical dimensions. Moreover, Shpet made a step towards theorizing the 
sign in the act of artistic and literary communication, a problem Ogden and Richards 
were approaching without ever questioning the inner structure of the sign in creative 
activity. We might call Shpet’s semiotics an alternative path taken towards deep semiotics.
     Shpet began his reasoning about signs and sense by commonly accepted postulates. For 
example, the sign was seen as having contents and meanings: “By content and meaning we 
eventually mean the same thing, but depending mainly on whether we address it on the 
part of the object or the sign” (Shpet 2005: 477). According to him, this determines the 
correlativity of ontology and logic. Meaning is as correlative to sign as content to form. 
Meanwhile, the formational role of the object in contents (ontological forms) diff ers from 
the same role of the sign (logical forms). Shpet stressed the specifi c ontological position of 
the sign among other objects, which results from the fact that “the sign is a certain object 
as such with its contents and at the same time it acts as a sign of other subject contents” 
(Shpet 2005: 478). Shpet called this relation of the sign to its contents a “semantic” or 
“semasiological” correlation, diff erentiating it from the semiotic properties of the sign. 
Marty’s and Gomperz’s semasiology serves for him as a quest for sense in the essence, 
before the essence manifests itself as a sign. He explains this in his essay “Wisdom or 
6 Shpet might have had an idea about Saussure’s study of signs from the discussions held in 
the Moscow Linguistic Circle. However, at any rate, Saussure’s argument for the sign’s arbitrary 
nature seems to contradict Shpet’s own point about the “inner” dimension of the sign.
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reason”:  “we regard essence itself as a sign […] the semasiological approach to essence 
itself forces one eo ipso to search in it, as in a ‘foundation’ (nachale), for sense, which opens 
up before us as the rational basis (razumnoe osnovanie) deposited in essence itself; here 
essence in its content proceeds out of reason (razuma) as out of its founding principle” 
(cited in Seifrid 2009: 171). Th erefore, Shpet distinguishes two types of relations within 
the structure of the sign: semiotic (relation of the sign as an object of empirical reality to 
its specifi c contents) and semasiological (relation of the sign to the referential meaning 
preceding the sign’s objective form).
     What is the correlation between sign and meaning, form and content, about? Shpet 
explained it in philosophical terms: “Th e specifi city of the sign as an agent of correlation 
should be seen in the fact that upon being distanced from its given sensual being, for 
example, its physical being, it is in the forms of ideal being but not in the new forms of 
the same status of being, that it leads us to other terms of relation, to a correlate” (Shpet 
2005: 518). In purely semiotic terms, this problem would appear as the complexity of the 
sign’s structure, the sign being an agent of correlation of the signifi er and the signifi ed. 
Again, what Shpet stressed was the task of determining the ontological (semasiological) 
properties of the sign itself, rather than its logical and formal properties.
     Th e category of correlation is a key point in Shpet’s conception of the sign. Th e 
“ontological status of the sign” was seen in that the sign is “not only the agent of relation, 
correlative to its meaning but also a certain relation in itself implying its specifi c terms” 
(Shpet 2005: 520). What did Shpet stress in diff erentiating the two notions: ‘agent of 
relation’ and ‘relation as such’? ‘Agent of relation’ is a static category, whereas relation 
itself is a dynamic concept. ‘Relation’ in Shpet’s sense meant the process of reference. 
Sign as an agent of relation is informed by its “outer forms”, whereas relation itself may 
be analysed through “inner forms”, as Shpet called them. 
     Th e diff erence between outer and inner forms was the subject of Shpet’s later book 
Inner Form of the Word (1927). Based on Wilhelm von Humboldt’s seminal concept 
of ‘the inner form of language’ and its further elaboration by Alexander Potebnya 
towards a more empirical understanding of ‘the inner form of the word’ as the word’s 
etymological meaning, Shpet proceeded to study the inner form as an “algorithm” of 
the word’s formation. He distinguished between the inner form of the concept in logic 
(“inner logical form”) and the inner form of the trope in poetry (“inner poetic form”). 
According to him, inner forms are carriers of semantic structures inherent to words in 
their discursive realization. Th e word as a unity of its outer and inner forms consitutes 
“the only completely universal sign”, capable of replacing any other sign, and provides 
“the ontological prototype for every other social or cultural artifact”, as Th omas Seifrid 
(2005: 163) summarizes Shpet’s philosophy of the sign.
     In the semiotic context of Language and Sense, the diff erence between outer and inner 
forms was important in order to explain the structure of the sign. Shpet constructed 
the following table:
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As we can see, Shpet described inner forms as forms of relation itself, whereas outer 
forms, otherwise called “forms of combination” by Shpet, refer to the empirical and 
material substance of the sign. Projected onto the structure of the sign, this scheme 
does not look like a dyadic Saussurian model or a triadic model according to Peirce, 
Frege or Bühler. Shpet’s model represents a dynamic process of semiosis rather than 
a static entity.
     Why is this model dynamic? Th e point is that the outer form of the sign is fi nite. 
But each sign is always a means of eff ecting a goal, producing an idea, which means 
that from the static perception of the outer form we proceed to establishing a relation 
between the means and the ends as a subjective action: “From perceiving the outer form 
of fi niteness I proceed to the relation of the idea’s self-implementation” (Shpet 2005: 
553–554). Th is process is, indeed, dynamic, as it implies movement from intention 
to implementation.  Shpet illustrated this dynamics through a very simple example 
of how words change into utterances: “A ‘part’ of the word moves and advances to 
the ‘full word’; the ‘full word’ – to a ‘collocation’, for example, to a sentence or a larger 
utterance; the utterance – still further and more extensively and so on. Th e part results 
in the whole, the ‘thing’ – in a ‘relation’, the relation – in a higher-order relation; and in 
whatever categories – logical, grammatical or metaphysical – we express this essential 
characteristics of the word, dynamism and movement become clear” (Shpet 2005: 584). 
Th e word as a sign is fundamentally dynamic, according to this conception.
     Th e word as a sign correlative to its meanings thus becomes a notion: “As such, the 
sign is no longer a means of eff ecting a thought […] the sign becomes thought itself, 
a notion, an idea, a content” (Shpet 2005: 554). Th e meaning implemented in the sign 
produces sense. Shpet’s semiotics diff ered from other traditions contemporary to him 
in that it introduced the category of purpose into semiosis, only several decades later 
actualized by classics of pragmatic semiotics such as Charles Morris, Émile Benveniste 
and John Austin. As early as in the 1920s Shpet was paving the way for the semiotics 
of understanding, which conceptualized the sign within the dynamic process of sense-
production. 






5. Deep semiotics: an implicit tradition 
in Russian philosophy of language
Th e notion of the ‘inner form of the word’ mentioned above lies at the core of Shpet’s 
philosophy of language. More specifi cally, it allows analysing the structure of the sign 
in its depth, and in the very relation between sign and sense. It is worth noting that 
Shpet’s conception of the inner form was introduced in his study of aesthetic forms in 
literature, more precisely, in poetry. According to him, poetic language diff ers from 
ordinary speech in that it serves not the pragmatic purposes of everyday communication 
but, as Shpet put it, “its own inner purposes of self-development”. In other words, in 
the artistic semiosis self-communication dominates. Poetic language implements a 
systematic authorial intention. Th e inner form is the rule of the image’s production. 
Th is rule, Shpet explained, is nothing else but a device, a method and a principle 
of selection with a purpose of expressing, communicating and transferring of sense. 
By introducing the term “inner form” Shpet sought to analyse the forms of human 
creativity in language. Shpet’s semiotics described the signs used by a particular person 
or author with a particular creative goal. Considering the sign as a perceived thing or, 
more importantly, as a comprehended thing we “go deep into the thing itself ”, as he 
put it (Shpet 2005: 559). Th e metaphor of depth is ubiquitous in Shpet’s writings. For 
example, he uses it when he metaphorically describes the sign as a cabbagehead with 
multiple layers and leaves covering the cabbage stalk.  
     Deep semiotics in this sense allows for a transition from a two-dimensional analysis 
to a stereometrical one, providing for the depth of an object analysed. Th is kind of 
analysis digs deep towards the sources of sense-production in its dynamics. To a 
certain extent, this kind of analysis may remind of generative, or transformational, 
grammar developed in the 1970–80s, which distinguished between “deep” and “surface” 
structures of language. Poetics also developed a similar generative approach based on 
both Chomsky’s ‘deep structures’ and Greimas’ studies of the structure of literary text 
(see, e.g., Van Dijk 1971; Scheglov, Zholkovsky 1987). Th e Danish poet and semiotician 
Per Aage Brandt even coined the term ‘deep semiotics’ to point at the dynamic nature 
of linguistic transformations in grammar (Brandt 1989). What is meant by a Shpetian 
tradition of ‘deep semiotics’ is somewhat diff erent, though. As Grigorij Tul’chinsky 
(2003: 73) suggests, deep semiotics implies the extension of the theory of sign systems 
by means of the categories of conceptualization and meaning-making. Such an approach 
“is similar to the transition from two-dimensional, surface analysis to a stereometrical 
one, providing for the depth of analysis” (Tul’chinsky 2003: 73). Th e object of deep 
semiotics in this sense would be sign systems in creative processes. It is exactly the 
creative potentialities of the word as a sign that Shpet was mainly interested in.
     Shpet was to abandon his philosophical and semiotic studies in the 1930s. Most 
of his writings were left  unpublished and remained so long aft er his execution by the 
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     Due to historical circumstances, Gustav Shpet’s direct legacy in the tradition of 
deep semiotics was broken down at the turn of the 1930s–40s. Further developments 
in this direction could be the subject of another paper. By further developments of 
Shpet’s semiotic ideas I mean not only their (very rare) reception in post-WWII 
Russian semiotics but also reactualization of his studies in literary semiotics and 
semiotic aesthetics. Shpet’s approach to problems of the sign may be relevant today in 
developing further the semiotics of understanding as an anthropocentric approach to 
linguistic and artistic creativity. Today’s semiotics is highly concerned with advancing 
the understanding of human sign systems (Deely 2001; Luure 2006; Petrilli 2009) and 
the man-machine hermeneutics (Dem’jankov 1998). In a still broader light, Shpet’s 
“deep semiotics” may contribute to understanding the nature of human creativity and 
cognition in a way similar to how “deep ecology” (Kull 2011) contributes to today’s 
critical environmental concerns. Th e “depths” of Shpetian semiotics leave much to 
explore in the context of linguistics, literature and cultural studies. 7
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Глубинная семиотика Густава Шпета: наука о понимании знаков
Статья посвящена неявной традиции «глубинной семиотики» в России, ведущей свое 
происхождение от русского философа языка Густава Шпета. Семиотический подход 
Шпета развивался синхронно с магистральными линиями европейской и американской 
семиотики (соссюровской и пирсовской), но к настоящему моменту недостаточно известен 
и изучен. Недавняя публикация ранее неизвестных работ Шпета выдвигвает этого русского 
философа на авансцену русской семиотики. Шпет одним из первых среди русских ученых 
стал употреблять термин «семиотика», под которой понимал «общее онтологическое 
изучение знаков». Шпет импользует этот термин впервые в 1916 году в труде «История 
как проблема логики». Главная работа Шпета по семиотике – книга «Язык и смысл» (1920-е 
годы) – прослеживает истоки семиотического мышления и закладывает фндамент новой 
семиотики, рассматриваемой как науку о понимании знаков. Именно в этой книге Шпет 
пишет об онтологическом исследовании знака, называя эту дисциплину «семиотикой» и 
«характеристикой», а также поднимая вопрос о «семиотическом разуме». 
Gustav Špeti süvasemiootika: märkide mõistmise teadus
Artiklis vaadeldakse süvasemiootika varjatud traditsiooni Venemaal, millele pani alguse Vene 
keelefi losoof Gustav Špet. Špeti semiootiline lähenemine kujunes välja üheaegselt Euroopa ja 
Ameerika semiootika (Saussure’ist ja Peirce’ist lähtuvate) pealiinidega, kuid pole olnud piisavalt 
tuntud ning seda pole küllaldaselt uuritud. Špeti seni tundmatute tööde hiljutine avaldamine näitab 
seda Vene fi losoofi  edasijõudnud kujuna Vene semiootikamaailmas. Špet oli üks esimesi Vene 
õpetlasi, kes kasutas terminit “semiootika”, mille all ta mõtles “üldist ontoloogilist märgiuurimist”. 
Špet kasutas seda terminit oma teoses “Ajalugu kui loogika probleem” juba 1916. aastal. Špeti 
semiootika-alane peateos “Keel ja mõte” (1920) viis tagasi semiootilise mõtlemise päritoluni ning 
pani aluse uuele semiootikale, mille all ta mõtles märkide mõistmise teadust. Just siin kõneles 
Špet märgi ontoloogilisest märgiuurimisest, nimetades seda semiootikaks või karakteristikaks, 
ning tõstatades semiootilise mõistuse teema.       
